This essay argues for the significance of visual sources in intellectual history, using a case study on the central importance of snuffboxes in eighteenth-century debates regarding politeness, commerce, virtue, and manners. It highlights the authors, artists and advertisers who celebrated snuff-taking in both verbal and visual texts as a positive symbol of elegance, sociability and the transformative effects of polite commerce. And it analyses the highly sophisticated texts of London satirists who challenged this practice as symbolising the corruption associated with (...) luxury and commerce. Challenges to this practice, which involved some of the century’s most brilliant pens, from Sir John Vanburgh to William Hogarth and James Gillray, have been neglected by intellectual historians because of a tendency to treat visual sources as illustrations, rather than as significant contributions to political theory and debate. This essay argues that such an approach has resulted in an impoverished intellectual history and that images – and even snuffboxes themselves, used in highly articulated ritual performances of politeness and satirised in highly gendered terms – should be regarded as ‘texts’ and ‘idioms’ in the politics of politeness and patronage. It highlights Cambridge school contextualism as a method by which such texts may be read productively. (shrink)

Human emotional experience is organized at multiple levels, only some of which are easily penetrable by or dependent on language. Affects connected with mammalian parental care seem involved in Anna Wierzbicka's example of the experience of Jesus in Gethsemane. However, such affects are not characterizable as she requires, using only NSM's short list of linguistic semantic universals. Following her methodology, even using an enriched NSM really exhaustive of linguistic semantic universals, may involve serious losses of cognitive opportunity. Specifically, it (...) forecloses any possibility of linking language with other cognitive resources to construct novel concepts, as may be needed to understand the deep biologically-based structure of emotion—which, after all, goes far deeper in us than language does. (shrink)

Einrichtungen der Altenpflege weisen spezifische ethische Spannungsfelder und ethische Fragestellungen auf. Das Strukturinstrument EMMA (Ethik Multiprofessionell Methodisch Anwenden) zur Moderation einer Ethik-Fallberatung wurde für den Einsatz in Einrichtungen der Altenpflege konzipiert. Inhaltlich werden die Besonderheiten dieses Settings unter Bezugnahme auf den Schlüsselbegriff Privatheit in den Mittelpunkt gestellt. EMMA eignet sich aufgrund seiner Kontextsensitivität darüber hinaus zum Einsatz in der Ethik-Fallberatung in unterschiedlichen außerklinischen Settings.

Zusammenfassung Einrichtungen der Altenpflege weisen spezifische ethische Spannungsfelder und ethische Fragestellungen auf. Das Strukturinstrument EMMA (_E_thik _M_ultiprofessionell _M_ethodisch _A_nwenden) zur Moderation einer Ethik-Fallberatung wurde für den Einsatz in Einrichtungen der Altenpflege konzipiert. Inhaltlich werden die Besonderheiten dieses Settings unter Bezugnahme auf den Schlüsselbegriff Privatheit in den Mittelpunkt gestellt. EMMA eignet sich aufgrund seiner Kontextsensitivität darüber hinaus zum Einsatz in der Ethik-Fallberatung in unterschiedlichen außerklinischen Settings.

This article explores and challenges notions and methodologies of conservation, including the use of blockchain technologies as a means of establishing provenance of a physical BioArtwork, of the artist’s documentation encapsulating their intentions and of the conservator’s records required for the artwork’s ongoing care. The exploration is done through a case study of an art project called ‘Unruly Objects and Biological Conservation’ created by Anna Dumitriu with support from Alex May. The artwork consists of three items containing RFID tags (...) sealed in resin – which point to the location of the artist’s documentation. Therefore, the works physically include instructions for maintaining their inherent concepts and materiality for the benefit of the conservators. Such instructions can often be difficult to track down, or become disassociated from the artwork while the digital preservation of this storage method also poses its own set of questions. The works also include biological material including mud from a bacterial ecosystem known as a Winogradsky Column, living plant material and SARS-CoV-2 (coronavirus) RNA from a plasmid construct. (shrink)

This experimental writing piece by the Earth Unbound Collective explores the ethical, political and pedagogical challenges in addressing climate change, activism and justice. The provocation Earth Unbound: the struggle to breathe and the creative thoughts that follow are inspired by the contagious energy of what Donna Haraway calls response-ability or the ability to respond. This energy ripples through monthly reading groups and workshops organised by this interdisciplinary collective that emerged organically in January 2020.

In a Barbie World: Barbie as Narrative, Symbol, and Cipher brings together a group of global scholars representing different disciplines and identities to examine the myriad themes that emerge from the Greta Gerwig film, Barbie. -/- In 2023, Barbie unexpectedly became the highest grossing film of the year and surprised audiences with its perceptive exploration of feminism and feminist philosophies. Taking an inclusive, interdisciplinary approach, this collection is the first book to undertake a philosophical and academic consideration of Barbie. This (...) collection of essays approaches the film from different disciplinary perspectives, considering it simultaneously as a cultural phenomenon and as an academic text. Chapters cover a range of topics, including patriarchy, consumerism, capitalism, colonialism, sexual identity, race, recognition, relationships, mothers and daughters, queerness, girl power, feminism, and, of course, its theatre rival, Oppenheimer. -/- In a Barbie World: Barbie as Narrative, Symbol, and Cipher offers an accessible yet scholarly contribution to the fields of gender studies, political theory, philosophy, film studies, bioethics, and education, among others. It will be of value to students of these subjects at both undergraduate and graduate level, as well as to broader audiences who are interested in Barbie and its themes. (shrink)

People’s comfort with and acceptability of artificial intelligence (AI) instantiations is a topic that has received little systematic study. This is surprising given the topic’s relevance to the design, deployment and even regulation of AI systems. To help fill in our knowledge base, we conducted mixed-methods analysis based on a survey of a representative sample of the US population (_N_ = 2254). Results show that there are two distinct social dimensions to comfort with AI: as a peer and as a (...) superior. For both dimensions, general and technological efficacy traits—locus of control, communication apprehension, robot phobia, and perceived technology competence—are strongly associated with acceptance of AI in various roles. Female and older respondents also were less comfortable with the idea of AI agents in various roles. A qualitative analysis of comments collected from respondents complemented our statistical approach. We conclude by exploring the implications of our research for AI acceptability in society. (shrink)

Our understanding of the nature and processing of figurative language is central to several important issues in cognitive science, including the relationship of language and thought, how we process language, and how we comprehend abstract meaning. Over the past fifteen years, traditional approaches to these issues have been challenged by experimental psychologists, linguists, and other cognitive scientists interested in the structures of the mind and the processes that operate on them. In Figurative Language and Thought, internationally recognized experts in the (...) field of figurative language, Albert Katz, Mark Turner, Raymond W. Gibbs Jr., and Cristina Cacciari, provide a coherent and focused debate on the subject. The book's authors discuss a variety of fundamental questions, including: What can figures of speech tell us about the structure of the conceptual system? If and how should we distinguish the literal from the nonliteral in our theories of language and thought? Are we primarily figurative thinkers and consequently figurative language users or the other way around? Why do we prefer to speak metaphorically in everyday conversation, when literal options may be available for use? Is metaphor the only vehicle through which we can understand abstract concepts? What role do cultural and social factors play in our comprehension of figurative language? These and related questions are raised and argued in an integrative look at the role of nonliteral language in cognition. This volume, a part of Counterpoints series, will be thought-provoking reading for a wide range of cognitive psychologists, linguists, and philosophers. (shrink)

Do researchers produce scientific and technical knowledge differently than they did ten years ago? What will scientific research look like ten years from now? Addressing such questions means looking at science from a dynamic systems perspective. Two recent books about the social system of science, by Ziman and by Gibbons, Limoges, Nowotny, Schwartzman, Scott, and Trow, accept this challenge and argue that the research enterprise is changing. This article uses bibliometric data to examine the extent and nature of changes identified (...) by these authors, taking as an example British research. We use their theoretical frameworks to investigate five characteristics of research said to be increasingly pervasive—namely, application, interdisciplinarity, networking, internationalization, and concentration of resources. Results indicate that research may be becoming more interdisciplinary and that research is increasingly conducted more in networks, both domestic and international; but the data are more ambiguous regarding application and concentration. (shrink)

This essay asks the question “What would it mean to be a just university?” and answers to that the question may be understood in two ways. One way to understand “just” is procedural, having to do with internal governance and ensuring that a university’s policies are themselves just. The other is substantive, having to do with the university’s purpose or reason for existing. The second assumes the university is to serve some function necessary for the general good. This good is (...) often defined in material terms: fostering a stronger economy, medical breakthroughs, more efficient use of natural resources, and so on. But such a view of the university defines its value entirely by factors external to itself. Proponents of one definition of the university’s purpose typically acknowledge some validity in the other, and universities commonly strive to fulfill the claims of both definitions. But universities also have an obligation to teach the young and to do so within the context of a common set of values that both determines the setting in which teaching takes place and encourages students to develop values that will shape their own lives. Katz argues in particular that intellectuals have a special obligation to work cooperatively to eliminate intellectual obstacles that stand in the way of commensuration, communication, and comprehension globally. It is this responsibility that he calls “intellectual philanthropy.”. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Ethics & the Environment 7.1 (2002) 138-146 [Access article in PDF] Understanding Moral Limits in the Duality of Artifacts and NatureA Reply to Critics Eric Katz Ned Hettinger and Wayne Ouderkirk present some cogent criticisms of my ideas in environmental ethics, especially those ideas closely associated with my attacks on the process of ecological restoration. Both trace the source of my alleged problems to a pernicious dualism of (...) nature and humanity that they perceive in my environmental philosophy. In this reply I accept their basic analysis of my work but deny that my overall position leads to the problems they suggest. I explicitly endorse the dualism of human artifacts and natural entities, and I argue that this dualism exists along a spectrum of "more-or-less" natural or artifactual. I claim that this dualism is not pernicious, but on the contrary, it is the first necessary step to understanding the moral limits of human action in the natural world.I begin with a consideration of the formal structure of these critical papers—there is a remarkable formal similarity between these two essays. Each author begins with a brief review of the positive aspects of my position or "theory" in environmental ethics; then there is an analysis of the problems within the position, and the problematic consequences or implications [End Page 138] of my position for environmental policy and environmentalism generally; then there is an attempt to begin a solution to the problems encountered "on my own terms" so to speak—each author points out that within my position there are ideas that could be used to solve the problems uncovered. Thus I am urged to develop specific strands of my own thought—a recommendation that I (logically) cannot avoid.Now on one level this formal structure is commonplace in polite scholarly discourse. Before offering criticisms of an author—especially when he is in the same room—we cite a few positive things about his work, and we end by noting that the position of the author is not completely hopeless. So perhaps the structural similarity between these two papers is not particularly noteworthy. But in this case I think it is. For the structure of the papers points out a distinguishing feature of my work that I recognize: My work is essentially negative and critical. I believe that I am raising problems and provocative questions. My criticisms apply to both traditional ethics (especially as it relates to environmental issues) and to the standard (policy-driven) versions of environmental ethics (especially the anthropocentric and individualistic variations). My criticisms also create questions for mainstream environmental policies—or I so hope, for this is my chief purpose in doing environmental philosophy. Since it is essentially critical, the most one can derive from my work in a positive vein are suggestions or hints for directions in which solutions may be found. I readily admit that I have not followed these paths to work out solutions—at least not yet. Thus in a formal or structural sense I am in substantial agreement with my critics: my essays raise a lot of problems; I do not offer fully worked out solutions; but the seeds of possible solutions may be present in the body of my work.But I have to make one distinction concerning the nature of "problems." Ouderkirk and Hettinger raise two distinct kinds of problems when they interpret my work. First, there are (possibly) internal contradictions in my ideas that make the theory itself incoherent in some mostly formal way. (For example, my argument for the importance of nonanthropocentric value might hide a latent anthropocentrism—Ouderkirk says at one point that I may be letting anthropocentrism in through the back door.) And second, there are (supposedly) problems in my position because my view has serious negative consequences for standard environmental policies. (For example, both Hettinger and Ouderkirk claim that my view of the distinction between artifacts and natural entities makes impossible all restoration [End Page 139] efforts in the natural world.) Does my position lead to unacceptable consequences for standard environmental... (shrink)

(1999). Environmental education, ethics and citizenship conference, held at the royal geographical society (with the institute of British geographers), 20 may 1998. Philosophy & Geography: Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 82-87. doi: 10.1080/13668799908573657.

Because of the “problem of individual causal inefficacy,” it has been difficult to explain why a purchase that will make little to no difference to a producer’s wrongdoing is itself morally wrong. Some have recently appealed to the concept of complicity in order to support the idea that consumers have a moral reason to avoid purchasing from companies engaged in wrongdoing. In this paper, I contribute to the development of this direction in consumer ethics. First, I explore how we should (...) define moral complicity in such situations. Some have claimed that an individual’s purchase makes her complicit, even though it makes no difference to the wrongdoing, because she is still knowingly joining in with the wrong that the company or other consumers are doing. I argue, however, that it is difficult to see making a purchase as a form of joining in a joint or group action. Instead, I respond to the causal inefficacy problem directly. I argue that even when the outcome is massively overdetermined, an individual purchase still makes a causal contribution to the principal wrongdoing and thus a basic condition for an act of moral complicity is met. Yet, this does not resolve the deeper question of whether and why consumers should morally avoid purchases that make them complicit in these cases. The issue is with how small the causal contribution such an individual purchase makes. That is, an individual purchase in such a situation may only make one a little bit complicit. I argue that for the concept of moral complicity to gain traction here, we will have to appeal to normative concerns besides the outcome of the complicit action. Still, even with this account, purchases in such overdetermination cases may not often be all things considered wrong because the reasons against them may be outweighed by other relevant reasons. (shrink)

There has recently been a resurgence of philosophical and scientific interest in the foundations of self-consciousness, with particular focus on its altered, anomalous forms. This paper looks at the altered forms of self-awareness in Depersonalization Disorder (DPD), a condition in which people feel detached from their self, their body and the world (Derealisation). Building upon the phenomenological distinction between reflective and pre-reflective self-consciousness, we argue that DPD may alter thetransparencyof basic embodied forms of pre-reflective self-consciousness, as well as the capacity (...) to flexibly modulate and switch between the reflective and pre-reflective facets of self-awareness. Empirical evidence will be invoked in support of the idea that impaired processing of bodily signals is characteristic of the condition. We provide first-hand subjective reports describing the experience of self-detachment or fracture between an observing and an observed self. This split is compared with similar self-detachment phenomena reported in certain Buddhist-derived meditative practices. We suggest that these alterations and changes may reveal the underlying and tacit transparency that characterises the embodied and basic pre-reflective forms of self-consciousness, in the same way that a crack in a transparent glass may indicate the presence of an unnoticed window. (shrink)

While John Tomasi's Free Market Fairness is ambitious, provocative, and does much to reinvigorate debate about economic justice, his argument for market democracy is not compelling. I discuss two objections. First, I offer doubts about whether “thick” economic freedom is a condition of democratic legitimacy. While Tomasi raises the intriguing possibility that liberal commitments may justify a somewhat more expansive list of economic rights than traditionally recognized, he fails to give a well-worked-out account of these rights. Instead, he argues for (...) unfettered economic liberty without adequately connecting it to citizens' self-authorship, or showing how it could feasibly be protected alongside other basic liberties. Second, I argue that a concern for citizens' agency and economic self-authorship should lead us to endorse a social-democratic regime, not a market-democratic one. Market democracy leaves out or heavily revises key aspects of justice as fairness as developed by Rawls, including fair equality of opportunity and the fair value of the political liberties. Moreover, while Tomasi claims that social democracy rests on a perfectionist prioritizing of citizens' status over their agency, I argue that social democracy is best defended on agency-based grounds. (shrink)

This Article explores the rule of law aspects of the intersection between intellectual property and antitrust law. Contemporary discussions and debates on intellectual property, antitrust, and the intersection between them are typically framed in economically oriented terms. This Article, however, shows that there is more law in law than just economics. It demonstrates how the rule of law has influenced the development of several IP doctrines, and the interface between IP and antitrust, in important, albeit not always acknowledged, ways. In (...) particular, it argues that some limitations on IP rights, such as exhaustion and limitations on tying arrangements, are grounded in rule of law principles restricting the arbitrary exercise of legal power, rather than solely in considerations of economic efficiency. The historical development of IP law has reflected several tensions, both economic and political, that lie at the heart of the constitutional order of the modern state: the tension between the benefits of free competition and the recognition that some restraints on competition may be beneficial and justified; the concern that power, even when conferred in the public interest, can often be abused and arbitrarily. (shrink)

Jespersen (1860-1934:73-75) described what he called resumptive negation: “A second class [of emphatic negation] comprises what may be termed resumptive negation, the characteristic of which is that after a negative sentence has been completed, something is added in a negative form with the obvious result that the negative result is heightened. . . . In its pure form, the supplementary negative is added outside the frame of the first sentence, generally as a afterthought, as in ‘I shall never do it, (...) not under any circumstances, not on any condition, neither at home nor abroad’, etc.” Such examples have, to the best my knowledge, received no attention in the modern linguistic literature with the exception of the discussion by van der Wouden (1997) and mention (without discussion) in (Lawler 1977), plus brief comments by Klima and by McCawley (see van der Wouden) . A somewhat similar type of example (1) is known from Ross’s (1967) “Slifting” paper, where it is presented with along with extensive p.c. comments from Larry Horn; later in passim mention appears in (Horn 1989) and occasionally elsewhere. (shrink)

Books M and N of Aristotle's Metaphysics receive relatively little careful attention. Even scholars who give detailed analyses of the arguments in M-N dismiss many of them as hopelessly flawed and biased, and find Aristotle's critique to be riddled with mistakes and question-begging. This assessment of the quality of Aristotle's critique of his predecessors (and of the Platonists in particular), is widespread. The series of arguments in M 2 (1077a14-b11) that targets separate mathematical objects is the subject of particularly strong (...) criticism by Annas and Ross. Two related arguments in this series (1077a14-20 and 1077a24-31) will serve as cases in point. The principal charges made against these arguments (that Aristotle misunderstands or misrepresents his opponents' views, and that he engages in question-begging because he presupposes his own metaphysical views) are frequently made against Aristotle's critique of Platonist positions more generally. If, as I argue, these charges are false for our two test case arguments, then there is good reason to think that they might also be false when they are leveled against the other arguments in this M 2 series. And, although presenting an argument for this is beyond the scope of this paper, this suggests that these two charges are more often than not false when applied to Aristotle's critique of Platonist mathematical views in M-N and beyond. (shrink)

Changing values may give rise to intergenerational conflicts, like in the ongoing climate change and energy transition debate. This essay focuses on the interpretative question of how this value change can best be understood. To elucidate the interpretation of value change, two philosophical perspectives on value are introduced: Berlin’s value pluralism and Dworkin’s interpretivism. While both authors do not explicitly discuss value change, I argue that their perspectives can be used for interpreting value change in the case of climate change (...) and the energy transition. I claim that Berlin’s pluralistic account of value would understand the value change as an intergenerational conflict and therefore provide a too narrow and static ground for understanding ongoing value change. Instead, by exploring Dworkin’s standpoint in moral epistemology, this essay distills a more encompassing perspective on how values may relate, converge, overlap, and change, fulfilling their functions in the course of climate change and energy transition. This perspective is further detailed by taking inspiration from Shue’s work on the interpretation of equity in the climate change debate. I argue that the resulting perspective allows us to see value change as a gradual process rather than as a clash between generations and their values. (shrink)

There is at present a lively debate in cognitive psychology concerning the origin of natural number concepts. At the center of this debate is the system of mental magnitudes, an innately given cognitive mechanism that represents cardinality and that performs a variety of arithmetical operations. Most participants in the debate argue that this system cannot be the sole source of natural number concepts, because they take it to represent cardinality approximately while natural number concepts are precise. In this paper, I (...) argue that the claim that mental magnitudes represent cardinality approximately overlooks the distinction between a magnitude and the increments that compose to form that magnitude. While magnitudes do indeed represent cardinality approximately, they are composed of a precise number of increments. I argue further that learning the number words and the counting routine may allow one to mark in memory the number of increments that composed to form a magnitude, thereby creating a precise representation of cardinality. (shrink)

Superstition and confabulation are extremely pervasive in our cognitive lives. Whilst both these phenomena are widely discussed in the recent psychological literature, however, the relationship between them has not been the object of much explicit attention. In this paper, I argue that this relationship is actually very close, and deserves indepth consideration. I argue that superstitious and confabulatory attitudes share several key features and are rooted in the same psychological mechanisms. Moreover, some of the key features that superstitious and confabulatory (...) attitudes share reveal such attitudes to be non-doxastic in nature, with important implications for our assessment of their epistemic rationality. Many instances of what we call superstitious and confabulatory ‘beliefs’ are not, in fact, beliefs; hence, entertaining them may be less irrational than it prima facie seems to be. (shrink)

This essay considers the idea of ‘representation’ and pain in neuroscience, continental philosophy, and analytic philosophy. To do so, it considers two forms of representation: _linguistic representation_ refers to how words stand in for experiences or things, while _mental representation_ involves the mind's internal depiction of external reality. First, I consider how the question of pain may be conveyed as a question of representation through the McGill Pain Quotient. I then turn to phenomenology to consider how pain cuts straight through (...) representation. Pain is simultaneously an extra-mental experience and an introspective phenomenal experience involving the affect of pain and the social expression of that affect. But to illustrate how pain lacks intention, I consider how the term ‘representation’ in the neuroscience on cognitive empathy for pain obfuscates the affective ontology of pain experiences. Linguistic expression of pain may suggest belief and representational data, while the phenomenological experience centers around the affective and embodied. Ultimately, the response to pain plays out in social acknowledgement, and both linguistic and mental representation offer necessary but insufficient understandings of ethical acknowledgement. To that end, neuroethics can offer naturalist, physicalist grounds to affirm both the analytic and continental theses about pain and language. (shrink)

Like some ‘second wave’ feminists, Rousseau believes that modern sexual practices are not a manifestation of a newfound autonomy—rather, they reflect its systemic deprivation. Drawing on his critique of libertine culture in eighteenth century Paris, I show how even consensual sex may lead to a chronic deficit of recognition, coupled with psychological misery. To avoid such discontents, sexual freedom must include a satisfying sexual recognition. I articulate the conditions for such recognition as cultivated in Emile’s erotic education. Informed by amour-propre, (...) Emile would seek a sexual partner who could recognize him as superior, yet, because Emile is also endowed with pity, he would understand such superiority in terms of uniqueness, independence and authentic expression, rather than as winning the transient favors of public taste. I propose that Rousseau’s recognitive account of sexual desire is applicable to current-day philosophical and public debates. (shrink)

Quantitative research has called attention to the burden associated with informal caregiving in home nursing arrangements. Less emphasis has been placed, however, on care recipients’ subjective feelings of being a burden and on caregivers’ willingness to carry the burden in home care. This article uses empirical material from semi‐structured interviews conducted with older people affected by multiple chronic conditions and in need of long‐term home care, and with informal and professional caregivers, as two groups of relevant others. The high burden (...) of home‐care arrangements is unanimously stressed by all three groups involved in the triangle of care. An empirical‐ethical investigation of what can be legitimately expected from family members and informal caregivers, informed by Frith's symbiotic empirical ethics approach, was undertaken. Key tenets from the special goods theory and nursing professionalism are used as analytical tools. The study concludes that the current situation may hinder professional development and can reinforce feelings of being a burden to relevant others. (shrink)

The extended mind view and the embodied-grounded view of cognition and language are typically considered as rather independent perspectives. In this paper we propose a possible integration of the two views and support it proposing the idea of “Words As social Tools” (WAT). In this respect, we will propose that words, also due to their social and public character, can be conceived as quasi-external devices that extend our cognition. Moreover, words function like tools in that they enlarge the bodily space (...) of action thus modifying our sense of body. To support our proposal, we review the relevant literature on tool-use and on words as tools and report recent evidence indicating that word use leads to an extension of space close to the body. In addition, we outline a model of the neural processes that may underpin bodily space extension via word use and may reflect possible effects on cognition of the use of words as external means. We also discuss how reconciling the two perspectives can help to overcome the limitations they encounter if considered independently. (shrink)

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Suñña at the Bone:Emily Dickinson’s Theravadin RomanticismAdam KatzA narrow Fellow in the GrassOccasionally rides—You may have met him? Did you notHis notice instant is—The Grass divides as with a Comb—A spotted Shaft is seen,And then it closes at your FeetAnd opens further on—He likes a Boggy Acre—A Floor too cool for Corn—But when a Boy and BarefootI more than once at NoonHave passed I thought a Whip LashUnbraiding in (...) the SunWhen stooping to secure itIt wrinkled And was gone—Several of Nature’s PeopleI know and they know meI feel for them a transportOf CordialityBut never met this FellowAttended or aloneWithout a tighter BreathingAnd Zero at the Bone.1Via the Arabic word cipher, the English word “zero” comes straight from the Sanskrit word shunya (empty). In Pali, the early Buddhist liturgical language, it is suñña. This poem’s story recalls the common Buddhist simile where a rope is mistaken for a snake in the dim light. There is nothing in the rope that should be feared as a snake, and likewise there is ultimately nothing in the five aggregates—basically, everything—that [End Page 111] can be regarded as atman (soul, self). So the aggregates are empty of self: anatta, in Pali. This is the doctrine of emptiness. Fallaciously imputing selfhood to the inherently selfless flux of the aggregates is a major source of suffering, so realizing emptiness brings liberation, just as investigating the rope and finding it empty of snakehood liberates one from fright.Recognizing that the rope is a rope and not a snake is a simile for realizing emptiness. Likewise, in the poem, recognizing that the snake is a snake and not a “Whip Lash / Unbraiding in the Sun” catapults the speaker into a sublime experience of “Zero at the Bone.” This last line may be a metaphor for being chilled to the bone, but the absence of a subject for zero to modify and the sonic and aesthetic overload in an otherwise mostly matter-of-fact nature poem suggest that the sudden recognition of the snake scares us out of ourselves, empties us out, providing a Romantic corollary for Buddhist emptiness.In the Buddhist simile and in the poem, the correction of faulty recognition precipitates the realization of emptiness. But in the simile, what is primarily important is that the rope is recognized as not a snake. One Tibetan text says that substantial progress can be made by, as it were, mistaking the rope for a vine, just so the scary snake perception is cleared away.2 A slightly later Tibetan text says that, simile aside, recognizing that the rope is not a snake and not even a vine but precisely a rope is merely a matter of “conventional valid cognition,” which stops far short of liberating insight into the selflessness of phenomena as such.3 Believing the rope really is a rope is the same as, in the simile, mistaking the rope for a snake, because in both cases it is a matter of perceiving substantiality where there is impermanence. By contrast, Dickinson’s poem emphasizes neither clearing up a particularly pernicious and persistent misconception about existence nor replacing this misconception with complete insight; rather, the poem emphasizes “conventional valid cognition” itself as a vehicle for sublime transcendence. The ecstatic experience of “Zero at the Bone” requires that the snake be accurately recognized as a snake.This “conventional valid cognition” is technically compatible with complete insight into the selflessness of phenomena as such, and it is certainly possible that the speaker experiences zeroness due to an optical illusion or hallucination or dream rather than recognizing a real snake, but the poem does not highlight either of these possibilities. It emphasizes recognitional accuracy, and being thrown from the quotidian as a result. This is quite different from the lesson of the Buddhist simile, where, again, the emphasis is on what is not there, specifically selfhood, rather than on what is there in its precise distinctness from other things. In this regard the poem is, however, eminently compatible... (shrink)

The current COVID-19 pandemic and the previous SARS/MERS outbreaks of 2003 and 2012 have resulted in a series of major global public health crises. We argue that in the interest of developing effective and safe vaccines and drugs and to better understand coronaviruses and associated disease mechenisms it is necessary to integrate the large and exponentially growing body of heterogeneous coronavirus data. Ontologies play an important role in standard-based knowledge and data representation, integration, sharing, and analysis. Accordingly, we initiated the (...) development of the community-based Coronavirus Infectious Disease Ontology in early 2020. -/- As an Open Biomedical Ontology (OBO) library ontology, CIDO is open source and interoperable with other existing OBO ontologies. CIDO is aligned with the Basic Formal Ontology and Viral Infectious Disease Ontology. CIDO has imported terms from over 30 OBO ontologies. For example, CIDO imports all SARS-CoV-2 protein terms from the Protein Ontology, COVID-19-related phenotype terms from the Human Phenotype Ontology, and over 100 COVID-19 terms for vaccines (both authorized and in clinical trial) from the Vaccine Ontology. CIDO systematically represents variants of SARS-CoV-2 viruses and over 300 amino acid substitutions therein, along with over 300 diagnostic kits and methods. CIDO also describes hundreds of host-coronavirus protein-protein interactions (PPIs) and the drugs that target proteins in these PPIs. CIDO has been used to model COVID-19 related phenomena in areas such as epidemiology. The scope of CIDO was evaluated by visual analysis supported by a summarization network method. CIDO has been used in various applications such as term standardization, inference, natural language processing (NLP) and clinical data integration. We have applied the amino acid variant knowledge present in CIDO to analyze differences between SARS-CoV-2 Delta and Omicron variants. CIDO's integrative host-coronavirus PPIs and drug-target knowledge has also been used to support drug repurposing for COVID-19 treatment. -/- CIDO represents entities and relations in the domain of coronavirus diseases with a special focus on COVID-19. It supports shared knowledge representation, data and metadata standardization and integration, and has been used in a range of applications. (shrink)

There is a common refrain in the literature on punishment that presumes the mutual exclusivity of defending retribution and adopting a humanistic or welfare-oriented outlook. The refrain, that if we want to be humane, or care about human welfare, we must abandon retributive punishment, anger, and resentment is readily repeated, endorsed, and relied upon. This article suggests that this opposition is false: retribution and welfare-orientation can not only be endorsed concomitantly, but are complimentary projects, and may even be grounded in (...) the same normative basis, such that if we endorse one we are already committed to ideas that ground reason to care about the other.My primary target will be claims that aim to undermine retributivism by demonstrating the desirability of welfare-orientation. If both can live together, demonstrating the attractiveness of one goes nowhere toward displacing the other. Further, establishing this claim invites further inquiry into classic questions about the “barbaric,” or “morally repugnant” credentials of retributivism. Confronting these claims will elucidate the consistency of adopting both retributive and welfare-oriented views, which, I suggest, can be jointly adopted and pursued. (shrink)

This paper proposes a qualitative study exploring anomalous self and world-experiences in individuals with high levels of depersonalization experiences. Depersonalization (DP) is a condition characterized by distressing feelings of being a detached, neutral and disembodied onlooker of one’s mental and bodily processes. Our findings indicate the presence of a wide range of anomalous experiences traditionally understood to be core features of DP, such as disembodiment and disrupted self-awareness. However, our results also indicate experiential features that are less highlighted in previous (...) work, such as faster time perception and blurriness of the self/other boundaries which may play a key role in altering one’s sense of self and sense of presence in the world. Our qualitative study provides an in-depth examination of self-reported disturbances of one’s relatedness to one’s self and the world, thereby shedding further light on the nature of altered subjective experiences in DP. In doing so, this paper draws attention to key aspects yet overlooked that may prove valuable for shedding further light into the phenomenon of depersonalization. We conclude by highlighting limitations of this study and a number of open questions that further work needs to address in the future. (shrink)

Following SOX, financial restatements increased dramatically. Prior research suggests that how investors respond to restatements, particularly those involving fraud, may mitigate or exacerbate damage suffered. We extend both accounting and management research by examining the joint effects of pre-restatement managerial reputation and the announcement of managerial corrective actions in response to a restatement on nonprofessional investors’ judgments. We find that pre-restatement managerial reputation and the announcement of managerial corrective actions jointly influence investors’ managerial fraud prevention assessments, which mediate their trust (...) in management. These trust perceptions in turn affect investors’ investment and CEO retention judgments. Our results have implications for firms that are concerned with lessening the negative consequences associated with issuing a restatement. (shrink)

In Metaphysics B.2 and M.2, Aristotle gives a series of arguments against Platonic mathematical objects. On the view he targets, mathematicals are substances somehow intermediate between Platonic forms and sensible substances. I consider two closely related passages in B2 and M.2 in which he argues that Platonists will need intermediates not only for geometry and arithmetic, but also for the so-called mixed mathematical sciences, and ultimately for all sciences of sensibles. While this has been dismissed as mere polemics, I show (...) that the argument is given in earnest, as Aristotle is committed to its key premises. Further, the argument reveals that Annas’ uniqueness problem is not the only reason a Platonic ontology needs intermediates. Finally, since Aristotle’s objection to intermediates for the mixed mathematical sciences is one he takes seriously, so that it is unlikely that his own account of mathematical objects would fall prey to it, the argument casts doubt on a common interpretation of his philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

Human individuals often exhibit important differences in their sensitivity to ionising radiation. Extensive literature links radiation sensitivity with impaired DNA repair which is due to a lack of correct functioning in many proteins involved in DNA‐repair pathways and/or in DNA‐damage checkpoint responses. Given that ionising radiation is an important and widespread diagnostic and therapeutic tool, it is important to investigate further those factors and mechanisms that underlie individual radiosensitivity. Recently, evidence is accumulating that telomere function may well be involved in (...) cellular and organism responses to ionising radiation, broadening still further the currently complex and challenging scenario. BioEssays. BioEssays 28: 1172–1180, 2006. © 2006 Wiley Periodicals, Inc. (shrink)

Research in phenomenology and philosophy of psychiatry has suggested that psychopathological disturbances of experience often involve an alteration of one's ‘sense of possibility’, dependent upon the presence of specific ‘existential feelings’ (Ratcliffe 2012). In this paper I provide an extended account of how the engagement with certain narratives can lead to a transformation of one's sense of possibility by eliciting affective experiences that are not consonant with the person's existential feelings. More precisely, I claim that, even when the experience of (...) some types of emotion is generally precluded by a restricted sense of possibility, such emotions may be aroused by particular self-narratives, and I explore how this dynamic can give rise to enduring and wide-ranging affective changes. (shrink)

During the pandemic of Covid-19, internet-based communication became for many the primary, or only, means of interaction with others, and it has been argued that this had a host of negative effects on emotional and mental health. However, some people with a lived experience of mental ill-health also perceived improvements to their wellbeing during the period in which social activities were moved online. In this paper, I explore the possibility that some of these improvements are due to the partial “disembodiment” (...) of emotions facilitated by internet-mediated interaction. In particular, I consider the phenomenology of social anxiety and how it may be impacted upon by encountering others primarily through the medium of internet-enabled technology. I will start by reconstructing a phenomenological account of social anxiety to which disruptions of bodily experience are central. I will then move to consider how the experiential dynamics that are particularly prominent in social anxiety can be weakened when communicating with others via video calls, instant messages, and social media more broadly. I will suggest that this is the case due to the diminished visibility of the body online, and the higher degree of control and agency over one’s experience that can be exercised in this context. Finally, I will argue that the weakening of social anxiety through internet-mediated contact exemplifies some of the processes which are key to emotion regulation more widely, thus suggesting that communication and interaction online could have a positive effect on a wider range of affective disturbances. (shrink)

Retroviruses encode a small, basic nucleocapsid (NC) protein that is found complexed to genomic RNA within the viral particle. The NC protein appears to function not only in a histone‐like manner in packaging the RNA into the particle but also in specifically selecting the viral genomic RNA for packaging. A cysteine‐histidine (cys‐his) region, usually composed of 14 amino acids and reminiscent of the ‘zinc fingers’ of transcription factors, is the only highly conserved sequence element among the retroviral NC proteins. This (...) review discusses the biochemical properties of NC, and its possible role(s) in retroviral replication. We also speculate on how the biochemical properties may relate to its function in RNA recognition and packaging. (shrink)

In debates on the ethics of artificial gametes, concepts of naturalness have been used in a number of different ways. Some have argued that the unnaturalness of artificial gametes means that it is unacceptable to use them in fertility treatments. Others have suggested that artificial gametes are no less natural than many other tissues or processes in common medical use. We suggest that establishing the naturalness or unnaturalness of artificial gametes is unlikely to provide easy answers as to the acceptability (...) of using them in fertility medicine. However, we also suggest that we should be cautious about repudiating any relationship between nature and moral evaluation. The property of being natural or man-made may not per se tell us anything about an entity’s moral status, but it has an important impact on the moral relationship between the creator and the created organism. (shrink)

Editorial Introduction to ‘Evolutionary Origins of Morality: Cross-Disciplinary Perspectives’. The four principal papers presented here, with interdisciplinary commentary discussion and their authors’ responses, represent contemporary approaches to an evolutionary understanding of morality -- of the origins from which, and the paths by which, aspects or components of human morality evolved and converged. Their authors come out of no single discipline or school, but represent rather a convergence of largely independent work in primate ethology, anthropology, evolutionary biology, and dynamic systems modelling (...) on related problems, conjectures and tentative conclusions. In inviting contributions I deliberately made no attempt to define morality more sharply than common language and understanding have left it, including our ordinary responses to right and wrong, but not all of the very diverse thinking about this and other practical concerns -- and about what we should make of all these -- that ethics encompasses. This was not because of any lack of past definitions of morality, but because the history of controversy over these makes it advisable not to prejudge the question pending our inquiry's results. From these we may see some outlines of plausible answers begin to emerge, only a brief sketch of some of which I can attempt here, sampling the hypotheses, scientific support, critical discussion of this, and refinement of positions in authors’ responses. (shrink)

We seek to elucidate the philosophical context in which the so-called revolution of rigor in inifinitesimal calculus and mathematical analysis took place. Some of the protagonists of the said revolution were Cauchy, Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass. The dominant current of philosophy in Germany at that time was neo-Kantianism. Among its various currents, the Marburg school (Cohen, Natorp, Cassirer, and others) was the one most interested in matters scientific and mathematical. Our main thesis is that Marburg Neo-Kantian philosophy formulated a sophisticated (...) position towards the problems raised by the concepts of limits and infinitesimals. The Marburg school neither clung to the traditional approach of logically and metaphysically dubious infinitesimals, nor whiggishly subscribed to the new orthodoxy of the "great triumvirate" of Cantor, Dedekind, and Weierstrass. Expressed in terms of modern mathematics, the Marburg philosophers saw the introduction of both infinitesimals and limits as completions whose prototype was Dedekind's of the rational number system resulting in the real numbers. At least partially,, this idea of "completions" can be captured in terms of a category-theoretical description of the conceptual development of modern mathematics. The feasibility of such a modern reformuation may be taken as evidence that the philosophical resources of Marburg neo-Kantianism may be of interest even for contemporary philosophy of mathematics. (shrink)

The present paper expounds the logic notation proposed by Augustus De Morgan in 1850 from within the original context of De Morgan’s account of syllogistic logic and his approach to quantification. The notational system of 1850 is shown to be a flexible tool to state inferences, to prove their validity and to derive formulæ of the respective system by ‘blind’ application of transformation rules. These pertain to the swapping of operator signs, which are of inverse ‘character’ in a two-fold sense: (...) The signs both represent inverse operations and exemplify oppositeness due to their very shapes. Thus, while De Morgan’s initial choice of symbol shapes is due to certain diagrammatic features, his notational system of 1850 leads to an account of logical operations as effected by manipulation of symbol tokens. It is concluded that as an instantiation of what De Morgan terms a ‘calculus of opposite relations’, his notation of 1850 may also be conceived of as a ‘graphicism’ affording for the working of a ‘symbolic machine’ on ‘de-semantification’. (shrink)

Abstract:While self-determination is a cardinal principle of international law, its meaning is often obscure. Yet international law clearly recognizes decolonization as a central application of the principle. Most ordinary people also agree that the liberation of colonial peoples was a moral triumph. This essay examines three philosophical theories of self-determination’s value, and asks which one best captures the reasons why decolonization was morally required. The instrumentalist theory holds that decolonization was required because subject peoples were unjustly governed, the democratic view (...) holds that decolonization was required because subject peoples lacked democratic representation, and the associative view holds that decolonization was required because subject peoples were unable to affirm the political institutions their colonial rulers imposed on them. I argue that the associative view is superior to competing accounts, because it better reflects individuals’ “maker” interests in participating in shared political projects that they value. The essay further shows that if we accept the associative view, self-determination is not a sui generis value that applies to decolonization alone. Ultimately, our intuitions about decolonization can be justified only by invoking an interest on the part of persistently alienated groups in redrawing political boundaries. The same interest may justify self-determination in additional cases, such as autonomy for indigenous peoples, or greater independence for Scotland or Quebec. (shrink)

Scholarship on gender and the European Union has consistently pointed out that EU gender equality policies have always been embedded in the logic of the market and that the economic framing has had negative impacts on the content and concepts of these policies. This article provides novel insights into this discussion by combining a discursive approach focused on framings with insights of feminist economists and examining how the relationship between gender equality and the economy has been conceptualized in EU policy (...) documents from the 1980s up until the present day. The article identifies the key actors and processes behind the escalation of economic arguments for gender equality and makes visible the economic assumptions that underpin EU gender equality policy. It argues that in recent years the European institutions have intentionally developed and propagated a market-oriented gender equality discourse, the economic case for gender equality, which highlights the macroeconomic benefits of gender equality. The economic case reaffirms the gender-biased assumptions of neoclassical economic theory and legitimizes the EU’s current economic priorities and policies, many of which are detrimental to gender equality. The European Commission represents the argument that gender equality contributes to economic growth as an innovative way to promote gender equality. However, the economic case represents a risk for gender equality advocates, because it may tame the emerging feminist criticism of the EU’s economic policies and governance. (shrink)

This article discusses two normative questions raised by cases of colonial settlement. First, is it sometimes wrong to migrate and settle in a previously inhabited land? If so, under what conditions? Second, should settler countries ever take steps to undo wrongful settlement, by enforcing repatriation and return? The article argues that it is wrong to settle in another country in cases where one comes with intent to colonize the population against their will, or one possesses an adequate territorial base somewhere (...) else, lacks an urgent interest in moving, and seeks to settle in a new place under conditions where settlement would severely harm the practices of prior occupants. It also argues for a presumption of repatriation and return in the first generation of wrongful settlement and holds that these remedies may be extended to second and higher generations in some – but not all – cases. (shrink)

We apply a framework developed by C. S. Peirce to analyze the concept of clarity, so as to examine a pair of rival mathematical approaches to a typical result in analysis. Namely, we compare an intuitionist and an infinitesimal approaches to the extreme value theorem. We argue that a given pre-mathematical phenomenon may have several aspects that are not necessarily captured by a single formalisation, pointing to a complementarity rather than a rivalry of the approaches.

The paper addresses the situation of a dispute in which one speaker says ϕ and a second speaker says not-ϕ. Proceeding on an idealising distinction between “basic” and “interesting” claims that may be formulated in a given idiolectal language, I investigate how it might be sorted out whether the dispute reflects a genuine disagreement, or whether the speakers are only having a merely verbal dispute, due to their using different interesting concepts. I show that four individually plausible principles for the (...) determination of the nature of a dispute are incompatible. As an example, I discuss the question whether Sarai lied in the story told in Genesis 12. (shrink)

Epistemic injustice is a kind of injustice that arises when one’s capacity as an epistemic subject is wrongfully denied. In recent years it has been argued that psychiatric patients are often harmed in their capacity as knowers and suffer from various forms of epistemic injustice that they encounter in psychiatric services. Acknowledging that epistemic injustice is a multifaceted problem in psychiatry calls for an adequate response. In this paper I argue that, given that psychiatric patients deserve epistemic respect and have (...) a certain epistemic privilege, healthcare professionals have a pro tanto epistemic duty to attend to and/or solicit reports of patients’ first-person experiences in order to prevent epistemic losses. I discuss the nature and scope of this epistemic duty and point to one interesting consequence. In order to prevent epistemic losses, healthcare professionals may need to provide some patients with resources and tools for expressing their experiences and first-person knowledge, such as those that have been developed within the phenomenological approach. I discuss the risk of secondary testimonial and hermeneutical injustice that the practice of relying on such external tools might pose and survey some ways to mitigate it. (shrink)